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"Corruption is often discussed in the kinds of language and symbolism
reserved for life-threatening diseases."' The World Bank insists that it "has
identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social
development., 2 This is problematic as no one seems to have found a universally
agreed upon definition of corruption. Nor is there absolute consensus on what
types of behavior within a loose definition are harmful. Johnson, however, argues
that in some respects there is too much consensus. "The new wave of concern has
been driven primarily by business and by international aid and lending
institutions. While there is nothing inherently wrong with that, their vision of
corruption, like any other, is partial."3
* Janet Dine is Professor and Director of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary,
London University. Her research is in the field of international economic law, and looks especially at the role of
transnational corporations in the global economy. Her most recent book on the topic is Companies, Inter-
national Law and Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
1. M. JOHNSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION (Colgate University 2003).
2. http://www.worldbank.org.
3. M. Johnson, Comparing Corruption in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 276 (Heffeman and
Kleinig eds.).
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Johnson points out that the major anti-corruption players ("USAID," World
Bank, "OECD," "UNDP" and "TI") 4 rarely address differences in the societies
whose corruption they seek to cure. Noting the way in which corruption and anti-
corruption has emerged onto the international agenda, Samson notes, "In the last
five or six years, anti-corruption practices have diffused transnationally and have
become organized globally. We have seen the emergence of a world of anti-
corruption with its own actors, strategies, resources and practices, with its
heroes, victims and villains."5 Samson moots two possible explanations for this
powerful recent emergence of the anti-corruption movement: first, "[tihe fight
against corruption is virtuous, and those who form part of the anti-corruption
community' are thus 'integrity warriors;" second, the need to increase system
rationality arguably "will make market economies more efficient, state
administration more effective, and development resources more accessible. 6
Pointing out that when anti-corruption norms are applied to projects "'global
morality' [becomes] ... a social process. It is a process by which virtue is
transformed into a specific activity called a project--one which includes
formulating a funding strategy, approaching donors, analyzing stakeholders,
hiring consultants, developing NGOs, conducting project appraisals, making
evaluations ... . Anti-corruptionism... is a stage in which moral projects are
intertwined with money and power."7 Because of this, "Anti-corruption ... is not
innocent. It can be manipulated to serve the interest of even the most
unscrupulous actors."8
Further, the interdependence of world economies makes the condemnation of
certain behaviors one-sided; that is, the behavior of one set of actors is
condemned while those on the other side of the transaction are regarded with
disinterest. This paper argues that such a system operates in certain tax havens,
and will spotlight the British Virgin Islands to detail a complex moral
phenomenon.
The British Virgin Islands are a tiny group of islands composed of the
remains of a volcano. As such, they are mountainous and have very poor soil.
With 20,000 inhabitants in such a location making a living is extremely difficult.
Moreover, the islands have a troubled history:
The English ousted the Dutch from Tortola in 1672, and from Anegada
and Virgin Gorda in 1680. The new rulers introduced the two quin-
4. United States Agency for International Development, Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation, United Nations Development Program, Transparency International, respectively.
5. S. Samson Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Balkans in
CORRUPTION 106 (D. Hailer and C. Shore eds.) (Italics in original).
6. Id. at 107.
7. Id. at 109-10.
8. Id. at 129.
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tessential features of the colonial era in the Caribbean: sugar cane and
slaves. At first, most of Tortola's 'planters' were more interested in
piracy and smuggling than agriculture, but by the 18th century they were
displaced by a new wave of experienced planters and a settlement of hard
working Quakers. Between the mid-18th and early 19th centuries, the
islands prospered, producing sugar, cotton, rum, indigo and spices. Slave
unrest and ideological doubt brought an end to slave auctions in 1803.
By the 1830s, slaves had been emancipated. Abolition and competing
sugar production in Europe and the USA were disastrous for the islands:
capital and settlers departed for more buoyant economies, and for the
next 100 years the islands' economy stagnated.9
The British Virgin Islands ("BVI") are an Overseas Territory of the United
Kingdom.' From a desperately poor economy based primarily on agriculture, the
economy has evolved to a service economy based mainly on the twin pillars of
tourism and financial services. The economy is very stable and one of the most
prosperous in the Caribbean. The estimated GDP per capita income in 2004 was
$38,500, one of the highest in the Caribbean."
The financial services industry has seen significant growth in the last few
years due mainly to the government's careful development of its offshore
legislative package and professional infrastructure. In the December 2005 budget
address, the Finance Minister Hon R. W. Skelton, projected that this sector would
contribute approximately $130,000,000 (63.99%) of the country's revenue during
2006. There can be no doubt that the sector is vital to the continued growth of the
economy.
However, the BVI was on the OECD list of corrupt economies and only
removed in 2002. While one of the OECD issues was the possibility of money
laundering, the very existence of tax havens is frequently condemned. While
concealment of the proceeds of crime fits almost any definition of corruption,
there are many who argue tfiat the establishment of tax havens to facilitate the
avoidance of tax is in itself corrupt. The condemnation, however, tends to be one-
sided, with the criticism focused not on the corporate culture, which seeks to use
tax havens to maximize shareholder profits, but on the countries which establish
the tax havens themselves. This paper will also raise a number of issues thrown
up by this partnership between the culture of companies that have established
more than 400,000 "shell" companies on the BVI and the development
9. Lonely Planet on-line guide, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/.
10. Although the Territory is popularly known as the British Virgin Islands its correct name, as the
Constitutional Commissioners pointed out in their 2005 report, is the Virgin Islands. For stylistic reasons, and to
avoid confusion, while using the term 'Virgin Islands' in the long form, where abbreviation was necessary we
have used 'BVI').
11. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: British Virgin Islands, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vi.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2008).
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aspirations of those living on the barren (but beautiful) rocks which make up the
BVI. As we will see, the public interest is often held to be significant in
definitions of corruption, but the public interest is a complex phenomenon,
especially where cross-border issues are at stake. Specifically, the issues are:
a) what should the definition of corruption be?
b) what consequences flow from wide or narrow definitions
c) what are the advantages or disadvantages of selecting wide or narrow
definitions?
I. CORRUPTION: DEFINITION ISSUES
One definition of corruption was put forward by Edward Banfield in 1975.
He described corruption as a relationship between three parties: the public as
principal, the public official as agent obligated to fulfill the wishes of the
principal, and a third party seeking to have the agent work on its behalf instead.1
2
This is a simple description of corruption but it raises a number of issues. Kleinig
and Heffernan explain, "it is not the predominant understanding of the term in the
Oxford English Dictionary; it leaves out much of what has historically been
deemed corrupt; and it relies on the superficial clarity of a private/public
distinction and an unexamined view of what counts as improper use. Corruption
is not the exclusive failing of public officers; there may also be personal
corruption, corrupt institutions, and corrupt cultures."' 3 Heidenheimer distin-
guishes between black, white and gray corruption, with black corruption being
perceived by both elites and ordinary people as fundamentally detrimental to
society, white acts seen by both groups as of some benefit to society, and gray
acts those about which the groups differed. 14 Holmes debates the definition but
settles for a "core" definition for the purpose of studying corruption in post-
communist states.15
While all these issues cannot be explored here, this paper challenges the
narrow definition of corruption and examines the concept of institutional
corruption. It also raises the further issue of cross-border corruption.
Interestingly, the Banfield definition is most apt in describing a bribe which takes
place within a single jurisdiction. It contains an assumption that the public
official is being bribed to act against the interests of his public. If we widen the
description to take account of behavior in (for simplicity) two jurisdictions, we
12. E. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization 18(3) J.L. & ECON 567-605
(1975).
13. WILLIAM HEFFERNAN, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 3 (Rowman and Littlefield 2004)
(emphasis in original).
14. ARNOLD HEIDENHEIMER, POLITICAL CORRUPTION (Holt, Reinhart and Wilson 1970).
15. L. HOLMES, ROTTEN STATES (2006 Duke University Press, Durham and London).
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may have an instance where the definition does not bite; if the condemned
behavior is approved of by the public in both jurisdictions, does the corruption
disappear? What if one public condemns the behavior and the other approves?
Let us consider the BVI example. As a moral and legal issue the use of tax
havens is problematic, some would say inherently corrupt, since it is clearly
contrary to the beneficiaries of taxation in the home state of the companies who
offshore their activities. However, it would seem to benefit one other public
interest within that same jurisdiction; the shareholders will receive greater profit
and the share price will go up. This is at least to their financial benefit. The third
public interest resides in the tax haven. Especially upon such unpromising
volcanic soil as the BVI, how else to develop? Tourism has natural limits;
financial skulduggery has none? If the scheme benefits two publics and
disadvantages one, do we accept majority rule? And if so, why was the BVI on
the list of corrupt tax havens when it was being used by many companies in rich
jurisdictions to increase their profits?
The problem with narrow definitions is that they can be selectively used by
the powerful to displace blame onto others and away from their own actions. An
explanation of the way in which selective narratives arise from narrow
definitions has been provided by Global Witness. 6 They report that in Congo,
Brazzaville, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, huge sums of oil and extractive
revenues have vanished; paid as bribes by the companies to the local elites. This
is despite the voluntary disclosure code launched by the UK government in 2003.
A UK government spokesperson explained that it was designed for the
governments of these countries to stamp out corruption. Global Witness had
suggested preventing parent companies from listing on the London Stock
Exchange, Dow Jones or Bourse (or any powerful country's stock exchange),
unless these companies were transparent about the sums of oil and extractive
revenues. The UK spokesperson explained that this was not possible since laws
would have to be passed in all the countries where the mining companies were
registered.'7 This is a manifest inaccuracy, since European Union ("EU") rules
and U.S. rules would cover most of the operations. The stock exchange of
Angola has, to say the least, a low profile in world affairs, but this attitude
displaces the burden to act onto the corrupt governments. This is manifestly a
recipe to appease the companies with smoke and mirrors while apparently
"tackling the problem."' 8
16. Press Release, Global Witness, Global Oil and Mining Sleaze Uncovered: Now It's Time for Tran-
sparency (Mar. 24, 2004) available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-detail.php/329/en/global
oilandmining-sleazeuncoverednowitstim.
17. BBC Today Programme Mar. 24, 2004
18. In Angola, one in four children under the age of 5 die of preventable diseases while $1.7 billion goes
missing each year. Companies involved in the scandal in the three states include Elf, Mobil and Chevron.
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It is noteworthy in this context that corruption indices have always
concentrated heavily on rating countries by the frequency of receipt of bribes,
rather than the source of the bribes, although there are some signs of change.' 9 In
2005, 159 countries were included in Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index.2° Only in 2006 was a Bribe Payers Index composed, rating
companies from 30 countries. 2' Further, the U.N. Convention against Corruption
encompasses acts such as trading in influence, abuse of functions, and
embezzlement of property in the private sector.22 It takes two to be corrupt, and,
in the Global Witness ihstance, it is clear that the bribes were coming from the
West. It is therefore necessary to consider much more carefully the definitions of
corruption that we use.
As we have seen, Kleinig and Heffernan argue that corruption is by nature
"essentially contestable" both as to its definition and its desirability.23 It is
suggested here that the culture which has grown up in some of our largest and
most powerful multinationals is a corrupt culture which merits as much attention
as public corruption, and may often be a contributory factor in the development
of other corruptions, including illegal or marginally legal offshore financing.
Euben argues from the basis of the Oxford English Dictionary, which associates
corruption with a cluster of words---decay, degeneration, disintegration, and
debasement. 24 This much wider definition opens up an investigation into
corporate culture.
Definitions that restrict corruption to public officials run the risk of being
accused of capture of the concept; that is, used selectively to condemn behavior
to achieve particular policy outcomes. This is particularly important when
corruption is used to impose conditionality on the grant of aid or loans. It misses
altogether the institutional corruption that is to be found in the aggressive,
deregulated corporate sector. Scenarios such as that in Enron and Worldcom are
informative on this point. It should be remembered that Arthur Anderson was
indicted, inter alia, for "knowingly, intentionally and corruptly" inducing
employees to shred documents relating to Enron. Shore and Hailer are clear that
such financial scandals "remind us that Europeans and Americans cannot assume
that grand corruption is something that belongs primarily to the non-western
'Other' or to public-sector officials in defective state bureaucracies: corruption
(both massive and systemic) we should not be surprised to learn, can also be
19. For a detailed examination of comparative indices see Johnson, supra note 3.
20. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 2005, available at http://www.transparency.org;,
see also TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 (2004 Pluto Press).
21. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (Transparency International 2006).
22. The U.N. Convention against Corruption came into force December 14, 2005 when the 30th stste
ratified it. See D. Jayasuriya, The expanding frontiers of international law in the fight against corruption, 67
AMICUS CURIAE 7 (2006).
23. HEFFERNAN, supra note 13, at 3.
24. J. Euben in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION, supra note 13, at 54.
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found in the very heart of the regulated world capitalist system. 25 This seems to
have been missed by the World Bank, whose definition is "the abuse of public
,,26office for private gain.
II. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS: CORRUPTION AS A MORAL
DEFLECTION DEVICE?
Thomas Pogge explains the ability of rational humans to shape their thinking
to suit their interests; "moral norms, designed to protect the livelihood and
dignity of the vulnerable, place burdens on the strong. If such norms are
compelling enough, the strong make an effort to comply. But they also,
consciously or unconsciously, try to get around the norms by arranging their
social world so as to minimize their burdens of compliance."" Pogge labels such
avoidance techniques "moral deflection devices. 28
There are strong reasons for believing that narrow definitions of corruption
act as a moral deflection device. It is certainly used as a "persuader" by lobby
groups with a particular agenda:
Most corruption involves agents seeking favors from public officials.
The larger the realm of government, the greater the opportunity for such
favours 'to be granted. If the government regulates trade, the corruption
can play a part in allocating export or import quotas. If the government
does not regulate trade there are no such opportunities for pre-
ferment.... But... certain enduring values seem to be more important
than the amount of government intervention in determining the level of
corruption (most notably personal honesty). What are we to make of the
fact that there are some relatively uncorrupt countries with very intrusive
governments, such as in Scandinavia? ... Can we create a virtuous
'chain of events with less government leading to less corruption and then
to a better functioning of the expanded domain of the market economy? 2
9
No surprise that the right-wing, free-market Institute of Economic Affairs
would like to argue deregulation of companies and a smaller State, if only the
inconvenient evidence of the Scandinavians did not impede the argument. Neild
takes a more balanced approach. Neild examines the emergence of "clean
25. CORRUPTION (D. Hailer and C. Shore, eds. Pluto Press 2005).
26. World Bank Anticorruption Home Page. http://www.worldbank-homepage.htm, (last visited June
10, 2006).
27. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Oxford 2002).
28. Id.
29. P. Booth, Foreword in IAN SENIOR, CORRUPTION-THE WORLD'S BIG C, (Institute of Economic
Affairs, London 2006).
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government" in north-western Europe ° in the 18th and 19th centuries, which by
no means went hand in hand with less government, and points out the dangers of
the reduction of government. "[A] policy of trying in a heavily governed country
to reduce the scope of government, and hence the number of rules that have to be
enforced, may be accompanied by denigration of the public service and by cuts in
its pay and conditions of such severity that, in combination with an idealization
of private gain, it may. produce an increase rather than a. decrease in the rate of
corruption. Russia today is an example."3'
However, at least corruption can be used by such lobbyists as an argument to
restrict aid: "The most effective way of putting international pressure on corrupt,
pauper nations is for aid to be available only to those that are demonstrably
rooting out corruption. Countries with corrupt governments should be excluded
from all aid programs and soft loans. Their international debts should not be
cancelled."32 As Haller and Shore note, the main structural approaches to
corruption have colonialist overtones; either by perceiving corruption as a social
pathology of "primitive" nations or by measuring corruption against concepts of
good governance. 33 "While advocates of this approach claim that the concept of
'good governance' is based on neutral, objective and non-cultural values, critics
argue that it reinforces the hegemonic values of the West as universal-precisely
by defining them as 'above' the realm of politics and culture. 34 A similar
problem lies with the Banfield approach noted above, the concept of harm to the
public interest being a notably slippery concept. In particular, Haller and Shore
point to the complex nature of the public-private distinction, which is
fundamental to many approaches to corruption. "In the conventional political
science approach, as in neoliberal ideology and in Transparency International
(TI) initiatives, it is the violation of this public/private distinction by individuals
that fundamentally defines corrupt behavior. Corruption is thus viewed as a
measure of how well a society distinguishes between public and private
spheres."3 Further, the distinction between gifts and bribes is an incoherent one
in some cultures.
Neoliberalism has set the frame for analytical models of corruption,
particularly in its restrictive World Bank definition of corruption as the
abuse of 'public' office. Stripped to its basics, the neoliberal thesis holds
that since corruption is primarily a pathology of the public sector, the
30. Although even these societies are subject to corruption, see CORRUPTION IN CONTEMPORARY
POLITICS, (M. Bull and J. Newell eds. 2003).
31. ROBERT NEILD, PUBLIC CORRUPTION 6 (Anthem Press 2002).
32. SENIOR, supra note 29, at 189.
33. For example, by Transparency International.
34. CORRUPTION, supra note 25, at 4.
35. Id. at 5.
270
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solution lies in reducing public spending and rolling back the frontiers of
the state. Shrinking the public sector, so the argument goes, reduces the
scope for public officials to engage in malfeasance. It also subjects
public officials to the regulatory disciplines of the market, to cost-
consciousness, and to entrepreneurial business ethics. To focus on
corporate crimes and corruption within the private sector is simply not on
the current agenda of the U.S. government or the IMF.1
6
However it is on the agenda of TI, which, following the Enron scandal,
expanded its operations and definition of corruption from "abuse by public
officials for private gain" to abuse of "entrusted power for private gain."37 The
limitations of this latter definition restrict the discussion to the "bad apple" theory
of corporate corruption, much favored in the Barings and Enron cases, which
argued that it was identifiable, corrupt individuals who caused the problem rather
than an underlying corrupt culture.3"
As Thomas Pogge points out, the belief that corruption is a "pathology of
primitive nations" is common to "many citizens of the affluent countries" who
hold that the global economic order is not to blame for severe poverty and
increasing global inequality. Rather, "poverty is substantially caused not by
global, systemic factors, but-in the countries where it occurs-by their flawed
national economic regimes and by their corrupt and incompetent elites, both of
which impede national economic growth and a fairer distribution of the national
product." 9 This comforting belief is accompanied by demands that the poor
countries must first help themselves by giving themselves respectable political
regimes. Or in other words, since (until imposition of regime change in Iraq) it is
not the responsibility of rich nations to impose regimes on others, nothing can be
done. Aid, if given, would only be lost to corrupt elites. However, these
comfortable beliefs "are nevertheless ultimately unsatisfactory, because it
portrays the corrupt social institutions and corrupt elites prevalent in the poor
countries as an exogenous fact: as a fact that explains, but does not itself stand in
need of explanation."'
The prevalence of bad regimes itself requires an explanation. By way of
providing an explanation, Pogge focuses on the extraordinary double standards
applied to a gang of thieves overpowering the guards at a warehouse and stealing
the contents, as opposed to a group overpowering an elected government. The
latter becomes the owner of the contents able to dispose of the natural resources
36. Id. at 18.
37. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20.
38. For a further discussion of this see below, especially the work of MacLennan.
39. POGGE, supra note 27, at I 10.
40. Id. at 112.
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of the country, transferring ownership to buyers, and can borrow freely on its
resources (the "international resource privilege" 41).
Indifferent to how governmental power is acquired, the international
resource privilege provides powerful incentives toward coup attempts
and civil wars in the resource-rich countries. Consider Nigeria, for
instance, where oil exports of $6-410 billion annually constitute roughly
a quarter of GDP. Whoever takes power there, by whatever means, can
count on this revenue stream to enrich himself and to cement his rule.
This is quite a temptation for military officers, and during 28 of the past
32 years Nigeria has indeed been ruled by military strongmen who took
power and ruled by force. Able to buy means of repression abroad and
support from other officers at home, such rulers were not dependant on
popular support and thus made few productive investments towards
stimulating poverty eradication or even economic growth. 2
The failure to alter the prevalence of corruption under Olusegun Obasanjo
has provoked surprise. But it makes sense against the background of the
international resource privilege: Nigeria's military officers know well that they
can capture the oil revenues by overthrowing Obasanjo.
III. CONSEQUENCE OF ADOPTING A BROAD DEFINITION:
COMPANIES AND CORRUPTION
As noted above, if we reject the narrow definition of corruption and associate
our search for a definition with Euben, looking at decay, degeneration,
disintegration, and debasement,43 this much wider definition opens up an
investigation into corporate culture. Recent scandals, including Enron receive
mention in mainstream corruption publications, but from restricted viewpoints.
TI's Global Corruption Report 2004 traces the US $6 million donated by Enron
to candidates for Congress or the presidency and the national political parties. 44
Although a limited perspective, it is a welcome one as it opens the debate to the
concept of "state capture," or the excessive deference of state organs to private
power. This author has argued elsewhere that the metamorphosis of modern
states into "market states" has led to the "willing capture" of states since
politicians consider that the money-making function of giant companies is
unequivocally good for their countries.4 ' Beyond that, it is arguable that corporate
41. Id. at 110.
42. Id. at 113.
43. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION, supra note 13, at. 54.
44. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20, at 74.
45. See JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Cambridge University
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culture has itself become corrupt by limiting the focus of companies to the
production of profit for shareholders. Enron had more than 3,000 subsidiaries
including 400 registered in offshore tax havens as part of its strategy to enhance
shareholder value.
MacLennan traces the roots of the current waves of corporate corruption in
America to early industrialization. MacLennan says there is inevitable and
fundamental conflict between the emergent values of market capitalism and
46democratic goals to protect the public interest. MacLennan argues that this
conflict was met by a network of regulations creating an American welfare state
that "not only provides a social safety net for the disadvantage in the economy,
but also welfare for the very rich and their corporations., 47 Examining why this
system seems to have failed so spectacularly over recent years, MacLennan
advances the argument that, while the regulatory system is based on the idea that
regulation is needed only during "moments of business failure,48 the clash of
values runs deeper:
Market values, which have their root in a pre-industrial, liberal society
based upon democratic citizenship and agrarian, small business
enterprises, have morphed into a new ethic of corporate capitalism which
no longer resembles the business culture of the past .... Corporate
behavior in the United States has become increasingly 'corrupt' and the
behavior of officials in the Enrons and Worldcoms is not isolated... it is
pervasive and institutionalized. That means, it is more than criminal
behavior by a few bad actors in an otherwise clean enterprise. It is
institutionalized in the everyday world-view and processes of corporate
action. 9
MacLennan's study is of the close networks that link the political and
economic elites, but also notes that "[d]efinitions of morality, public interest and
personal responsibility in corporate board rooms and executive offices may in
fact be quite different from those of the rest of the middle, working and poor
classes."50 An interesting example of this is the belief by Enron's ex-CEO Jeffrey
Skilling that he is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. This is unlikely to be mere
denial and may well stem from an unholy mixture of the "Alpha male
entitlement" syndrome which leads powerful people (not always males) to refuse
to believe that the rules of ordinary life apply to them, and by the fact that by
Press 2005).
46. Carol MacLennan, Corruption in Corporate America: Enron-Before and After in CORRUPTION,
supra note 25, at 4.
47. Id. at 157-58.
48. Italics in the original.
49. MacLennan, supra note 46, at 158.
50. Id. at 163.
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constantly driving up the share price he believes that he was doing precisely the
job that the company required in accordance with its aggressive market forces
culture.
MacLennan insists:
[C]orruption implies something systematic, institutionalized and perhaps
endemic to an organization or culture. It is pervasive, infused or
embedded in the system... . Corrupt or criminal behavior is individual.
If an alleged crime occurs, individuals are held responsible and receive
punishment through the courts. But corruption is institutional,
patterned-perhaps criminal and unethical from outside, but not
necessarily perceived as such by insiders. All of the attention to the
individual criminal executive is a detour from figuring out how
corruption works. An example is the coverage of the prosecution of
Enron's executives, CEO Jeffery Skilling and Chief Financial Officer
Andrew Fastow. All eyes are on the courtroom... and on possible jail
sentences-thus isolating the executive as the criminal. The corporate
culture that bred corruption, and the social expectations of the elite that
ruled the organization, have escaped scrutiny."
Let us look at some instances of the Enron culture as translated into action by
Skilling.
Skilling introduced a rigorous employee performance assessment process
that became known as 'rank or yank'. Under this system, the bottom 10
percent in performance were shown the door. There was heavy pressure
to meet targets, and remuneration was linked to the deals done and
profits booked in the previous quarter. 2
One thing the traders all loved about Enron was the sense they had of
operating in the purest environment that had ever been created in
corporate America. By pure, they meant that the trading floor operated
strictly by the dictates of the free market. The company's credo had
always been that free markets worked best, of course. But the traders
grabbed on to that belief with a cult-like fierceness... Maximizing profit
was not inconsistent with doing good, they believed, but an inherent part
of it.
53
51. Id. at 164-65 (italics in original).
52. STEWART HAMILTON & ALICIA MICKLETHWAIT, GREED AND CORPORATE FAILURE 36 (Palgrave,
Basinkstoke, 2006).
53. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM, 219 (Viking 2003).
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And always, hovering over everything and everyone at Enron, was Wall
Street.... In the. Skilling era, the stock became ... Enron's obsession. A
stock ticker in the headquarter's lobby offered a constant update on the
price of Enron shares. TV monitors broadcast CNBC in the building
elevators ... for Skilling himself. . . 'the stock price was his report
card.' When it rose, he was exultant; when it dropped, he was glum.54
Skilling's methods of. arriving at Enron's quarterly and annual targets
was downright perverse. Instead of going through a rigorous budget
process and arriving at a number by analyzing all the business units and
their prospects for the coming year as Kinder used to do, he would
impose a number based solely on what Wall Street wanted. He would
openly ask the stock analysts "What earnings do you need to keep our
stock price up?55
And the number he arrived at was the number Wall Street was looking
for, regardless of whether internally it made good sense.... Invariably,
as the quarter drew to a close, Enron's top executives would realize that
they were going to fall short of the number they'd promised Wall
Street.... when the realization took place that the company was falling
short, its executives undertook a desperate scramble to fill the holes in
the company's earnings.56
A similar corruption was evident in the fall of Barings. The lack of
supervision of Nick Leeson was attributable in a substantial degree to the feeling
that he was the goose laying the golden eggs so that stringent enquiries into his
activities or limitation of them should be avoided at all costs.
In a brief investigation of corporate culture, MacLennan notes the prevalence
of "shared corporate values predicated on the rights of property and the rule of
the market."57 Let us look more carefully into property rights and market
assumptions.
The US/UK model of companies and corporate law has shareholders as the
primary focus; the company must serve the interests of shareholders, and
directors are appointed and dismissed by shareholders. Nevertheless, directors
are to act in the interest of the company and usually owe no direct duties to
shareholders. This structure does not necessarily equate shareholders with the
company, nor does it equate shareholder interests with 'profit maximization' and
impose a duty on directors to achieve such a goal. Still, recent discourse has
54. Id. at 125.
55 Id.
56. Id. at 127.
57. Carol MacLennan, Corruption in Corporate America: Enron-Before and After, in CORRUPTION,
supra note 25, at 165.
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imposed the concept of profit maximization on the assumption that this is what
shareholders require, and the second assumption that shareholders and the
company are one and the same. Such an understanding of corporate aims has
wide implications for their behavior, since all considerations other than profit are
seen as negative externalities to be adhered to or to be bargained away if
possible. There is no doubt that this philosophy was one of the underlying causes
of spectacular bankruptcies such as Enron and WorldCom. In terms of moral
responsibility, such a construct of corporations means that they become another
method of moral deflection: because the purpose of corporations is to make as
much money as possible, those who tolerate and profit from their existence have
no responsibility for the methods they pursue. This ignores the fact not only that
companies are structured by national laws, but also that those who profit from an
activity have a responsibility to prevent that activity from harming others.
However, offshore financing muddies the water since, as noted above, we have at
least three different competing interest groups that may claim to represent the
public interest.
A. Underpinning Corrupt Companies' Free Markets and Neo-Classical
Economics
The Enron vision of free markets was based on neo-classical economics. It is
therefore important to examine closely the foundational concepts of this thinking to
understand how norms have emerged from the analysis. A key concept is
"efficiency," a term which also has emotive power. Who has ever heard of a
government asking advisers to formulate an inefficient economic policy? However,
notions of the measurement of efficiency vary. Pareto58 efficiency requires that
someone gains and no one loses. However, the Kaldor-Hicks test accepts as
efficient "a policy which results in sufficient benefits for those who gain such
that potentially they can compensate fully all the losers and still remain better
off.
59
The neo-classical economists believe that rational actors utilizing perfect
information will produce maximum allocative efficiency by making choices that
exploit competition in the market. In plain English, that means that everyone is
assumed to be equally rational, have equal bargaining power, and that there is no
asymmetry of information.
58. See explanation in ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 24
(Clarendon Press 1994) who immediately points out that there is no requirement for the gainers to compensate
the losers.
59. Id.
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Stiglitz explains the theories thus:
One of the great intellectual achievements of the mid-twentieth
century... was to establish the conditions under which Adam Smith's
'invisible hand' worked. These included a large number of unrealistic
conditions, such as that information was either perfect, or at least not
affected by anything going on in the economy, and that whatever
information anybody had, others had the same information; that
competition was perfect; and that one could buy insurance against any
possible risk. Though everyone recognized that these assumptions were
unrealistic, there was a hope that if the real world did not depart too
much from such assumptions-if information were not too imperfect, or
firms did not have too much market power-then Adam Smith's
invisible hand theory would still provide a good description of the
economy. This was a hope based more on faith-especially by those
whom it served well-than on science. My research, and that of others,
on the consequences of asymmetric information.., has shown that one
of the reasons that the invisible hand may be invisible is that it is simply
not there. 60
Since the invisible hand is not to be fettered, state regulations should be
removed so that a free market is permitted to reach maximum efficiency.
However, deregulation distorts the concept of freedom by removing regulation
that seeks to protect the vulnerable: trade union law, employment regulation, and
environmental legislation. Freedom to trade in this sense becomes someone
else's lack of freedom. It is notable that the slave traders defended their practices
on the basis that they must be allowed free trade.
It must be noted that any identified defect in the underlying assumptions
tends to have a cumulative effect, each building block contributing to a picture
which emphasizes the necessity for a market free of regulatory interference,
disguising the reality of imbalances of power that might be addressed by
regulation. The basis of the theories on a pseudo-scientific notion of efficiency
and the claim that creating wealth is beneficial for society as a whole, means that
the end result is a picture where interference with the freedom of markets needs
to be justified by anyone who argues for any regulation of market behavior. It is
important to note that Enron rose in the context of deregulation of the utilities
industries and of the accountancy profession.
Take first the Kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency. The concept that net gains
and losses need to be calculated and any net gain to any party is equivalent to
efficiency is open to "several powerful objections, at least as a conclusive
60. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: SEEDS OF DESTRUCTION (Allen Lane, London 2003).
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criterion of social welfare.",61 Ogus points to the coercive imposition of losses on
individuals, the assumption that one unit of money is of equal value whoever
owns it and its hostility to the notion of distributive justice. Ogus gives the
following example:
62
Suppose that the policymaker had to choose between: (A) a policy that
increased society's wealth by $1 million and benefited the poor more
than the rich, and (B) a policy that increased its wealth by $2 million, the
bulk of which devolved on the rich? Many would argue for (A) on the
grounds of fairness, 63 but (B) would be considered to be superior in
Kaldor-Hicks terms. 64
Now, if we see this argument in the light of Karl Marx's views on equality
and the concept of freedom we can see how the approach is based on the idea of
"notional equality" of the Kantian and Hegelian kind and how clearly Marx saw
the reality that given real inequalities which pre-date the time of the transaction,
inequalities will not only persist but become more and more accentuated. The
Pareto-Hicks formula does not insist that the winning individuals and the losing
individuals should be different in different transaction; in practice the powerful
become more powerful, the poor more poor and disadvantaged. 0. Lange
writes:6'
[L]et us imagine two persons: one who has learned his economics only
from the Austrian School, Pareto and Marshall, without having seen or
even heard a sentence of Marx or his disciples; the other one who, on the
contrary, knows his economics exclusively from Marx and the
Marxists... Which of the two will be able to account better for the
fundamental tendencies of the evolution of Capitalism?
Lange also makes the contrast between Marx's theory of economic "evolution"
and the fact that "for modem 'bourgeois' economics the problem of economic
evolution belongs not to economic theory but to economic history." 66 This static
nature may be seen as flowing from the essentially moral emptiness of current
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id.
63. See OGUS, supra note 58; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 1972).
64. This argument has powerful resonance when the operation of transnational and global corporations is
under scrutiny.
65. Marxian Economics and Modem Economic Theory in MARX AND MODERN ECONOMICS (S. Horowitz
ed., Macgibbon & Key 1968).
66. Id. at 73.
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economic theory; unlike Marxism it is not driven by a desire to achieve freedom
and fulfillment of a spiritual nature.67
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Definitions
1. Deregulation, Market Failure, Corporate Governance and Failures to
Fulfill Human Rights
It is clear, then, if we adopt a wide definition of corruption we are obliged to
take a fundamental look at some of our own institutions and to consider
corruption other than traditional bribe-taking behavior. This is consistent with the
scholars who call for constant re-assessment of institutions to prevent their
continuous and inherent tendency towards corruption.6 ' The disadvantage of
adopting a broad definition is that it defeats the move towards justicability so
popular with the "integrity warriors", because something so ephemeral as
corporate culture cannot be reduced to command and control outlawing tactics. It
is therefore sensible to adopt a criminalizing approach in "black" situations of
corruption, provided the consensus is wider than western organizations,
particularly where financial decision making is consequential on categorization
as "corrupt" or not. However, the recognition of corruption in a wider sense
emphasizes that it is not a hard and fast concept and exists beyond practices
condemned by all as fundamentally wrong. The understanding of institutions as
tending always towards capture by powerful interest groups enhances debate
about regulatory structures which can be found to counterbalance this inherent
trend.
IV. COUNTERACTING CORRUPT CORPORATE CULTURE
The call for regulatory structures to rebalance the company's focus on
shareholders so that it serves to deliver a more just economic outlook may be a
way of counteracting corrupt corporate culture. One of these institutions is the
capitalist market. Corrupt corporate culture is a market failure. Where there is
market failure there is a good case for regulations to try to correct the market
failure so far as possible.
"But for the market economy to function well, there is need for laws and
regulations-to ensure fair competition, to protect the environment, to make sure
67. See AREND THEODOOR VAN LEEUWEN, CRITIQUE OF HEAVEN (Lutterworth 1972), especially Chapter IV
"Human self-consciousness as the highest divinity"
68. See Michael Blecher, Law in Movement: Paradoxontology, Law and Social Movements in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CAPITALISM (Janet Dine & Andrew Fagan eds. 2006); see also ON PARADOXES AND SELF-
REFERENCE IN LAW (Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., Hart 2004).
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that consumers and investors are not cheated." 69 Stiglitz examines the ways in
which deregulation in the United States in the 1990's was instrumental in
assisting the economic "bubble" to grow and then burst, and the spectacular
bankruptcies and revelation of fraud that followed.
Regulations help restrain conflicts of interest and abusive practices, so
that investors can be confident that the market provides a level playing
field and that those who were supposed to be acting in their interests
actually do so. But the flip side of this is that regulation restrains profits
and so deregulation means more profits. And in the nineties, those who
saw the larger profits that deregulation would bring were willing to
invest to get it-willing to spend megabucks in campaign contributions
and lobbyists.70
So far as corporate governance is concerned, market failure occurred by
failure to regulate competition adequately, by permitting banks and accountancy
firms to merge and take on tasks that inevitably involved conflicts of interest, and
by using perverse incentives as part of the rewards packages for CEOs.7
Competition regulation failure came partly from the argument that the "New
Economy" had arrived, that it provided new conditions where innovations would
keep competition healthy so regulation was not necessary. Stiglitz was not
convinced. Analyzing the telecommunications market he writes;
"There were two reasons that I was suspicious of those who simply said
'Let competition reign.' The first [was] ... everyone talked about the
importance of being the first mover into a market. In doing so, they were,
in effect, admitting that they did not anticipate sustained competition.
There would be competition for the market, but not competition in the
market. That, in fact, was why those who had a head start in the race
were lobbying so hard: they thought they had the inside track, and the
payoff, if they won, would be enormous... But secondly, why, if the
local phone companies really thought that competition would break out,
were they so resistant to efforts to make sure that there was strong anti-
trust oversight?"
72
The second significant failure lay in permitting accountancy and banking
firms to merge into huge giants, carrying out activities which were clearly in
conflict of interest. Accountants were making huge profits by carrying on
consultancies for firms whose accounts they were supposed to be auditing, and
69. STIGLITZ, supra note 60 at 91.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Id. at ch. 4.
72. Id. at 97-98.
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banks were simultaneously lending money to firms such as Enron, while also
undertaking the placing of Initial Public Offers ("IPOs") of shares with the
public. The independent assessment of the lending branch of the bank as to the
creditworthiness of the firm was likely to be undermined by the wish of the
investment branch to do business issuing shares for the firm. This removed an
important device for monitoring the solvency of the company and gave false
signals. If the bank is still lending, investors would believe that the firm was still
solvent. Loans were granted to Enron until the last moment before the scandal
broke, and such loans only increased the size of the eventual shortfall for
employee pension plans as well as investors.
A third significant failure was "the strange corporate practice of giving
corporate executives stock options-the right to buy company stock at below
market prices-and then pretending that nothing of value had changed hands. 73
These transactions were not adequately disclosed. The importance of this is clear
to Stiglitz:
As a longtime student of the role of information in a well-functioning
economy, I [understood that] ... the executives are being paid too much
partly because it isn't widely known exactly how much they are really
being paid. And if no one knows how much the CEOs are being paid,
that means no one knows how much profit (or loss) the company is
making. No one knows how much the firm is really worth. Without this
information, prices cannot perform the roles they are supposed to in
guiding investment. As economists put it somewhat technically 'resource
allocations will be distorted.74
Further, compensation packages for CEOs ran out of control with boards
accepting huge increases and shareholders unable to prevent the packages going
through. "While senior executive compensation rose 36 percent in 1998 over
1997, the wages of the average blue-collar worker rose just 2.7 percent in the
same period .... Even in 2001, a disaster year for profits and stock prices,
executive CEO pay increased twice as fast as the pay of the average worker.""5
And you can be sure that it was not a percentage calculated from equivalent pay
at the outset. Stiglitz understands the cause of the downturn of the U.S. economy
as being significantly caused by these factors, which were all brought on by
deregulation and a failure to understand the correct role of regulation in
preventing or minimizing market failures. Market failures most significantly
impact the poorest in the community and are likely to directly cause non- or
under-fulfillment of human rights. The imperative is to prevent perverse
73. Id. at 115.
74. Id. at 118 (italics in the original).
75. Id. at 124.
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incentives and competition failures from so distorting the market that it fails. We
must be on guard against the simplistic economic viewpoint which is analyzed
above since it is still endemic in many policy think-tanks and government
advisors all over the world. Deakin argues, "[w]e have acquired a framework of
perverse incentives that rewards most those managers who are best at shifting
risks and liabilities on to the under-represented within the corporation (mainly
employees) and in society at large. This is the result of entrenching a particular
version of the "shareholder value" norm, associated with short-run share price
maximization, in corporate culture and practice.76
V. COMBATING CORRUPTION: COMPANIES ARE NOT PROPERTY
Paddy Ireland has made it clear that companies fit with difficulty into the
property rights discourse.77 This is because the traditional idea of companies is
that they are "the property of the shareholders" or "in the 'nexus of contracts' or
'agency' theory of the company, in what amounts to the same thing, that the
shareholders own not 'the company' but 'the capital', the company itself having
been spirited out of existence."78 Ireland also shows that there is considerable
convergence between the property rights of creditors and those of shareholders;
each can be seen as essentially outsiders having contractual rights against the
company, rather than insiders with membership rights. The remaining insider
rights of shareholders are relics of the time when joint-stock companies were run
by members and of an even earlier time when lending for interest was banned but
partnership for profit was not. An investment as a "sleeping partner" was a
convenient way to circumvent this rule.
The shareholder value norm itself rests on the myth of shareholder
ownership, that this myth is rhetoric appealing to the concept of property as an
important right which has distorted our understanding of companies and of
directors' duties by accepting that the gap between ownership and control should
be plugged by duties designed to align the interests of directors with those of
shareholder-owners. Because this structure is based on the myth of ownership it
is unhelpful and distorting, leaving out of account many of the real risks that
companies run: risks of damage to the company by poor treatment of employees,
the environment, and consumers, leading to not only to loss of reputation but to
the real danger of collapse from striving for a short-term goal of shareholder
value maximization at the expense of sustainability and long-term goals. As we
have seen, although greed motivated some of the fraud which was important in
76. Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility 70
GEO WASH L. REv. 976, 977 (2002).
77. Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MOD. L. REV. I (1999);
see also J. Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 (2000).
78. See id.
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the downfall of Enron, one of the most important motivating factors was a desire
to keep the share price rising. "I don't want us ever to be satisfied with a stock
price; it should always be higher. . . . Indeed, we still think that over the next
several months that there's a good chance that the stock price could be up as
much as fifty percent, and I think there's no reason to think that over the next two
years we can't double it again
' 79
There is, however, room for optimism:
For almost a quarter century, beginning in the early seventies, the
rational expectations school of economic thought dominated economic
thinking. This portrayed the individual not only as a rational being,
making consistent choices, but as someone capable of processing
complex information and absorbing all the relevant knowledge. Its
advocates focused on models in which everyone had the same
information-there were no asymmetries. In fact, few people know
enough math to process even the range of knowledge bearing on the
simplest investment decision. (the rational expectations theorists
conceded as much, yet asserted that, somehow, individuals acted as if
they had processed it all. Not content with upholding the rationality of
individuals, they portrayed the economy itself as a rational mechanism-
one in which, miraculously, prices reflect instantaneously everything that
is known today, and prices today reflect a consistent set of expectations
about what prices will be infinitely far into the future. The political
agenda of this work often seemed barely beneath the surface: if the
rational expectations school was right, markets were inherently efficient,
and there would be little if any need, ever, for government intervention.
The heyday of the rational expectations movement has ended, I am
pleased to report.8°
It is most notable that the most fervent believers of this creed have profited
from it (at least until they have gone to prison); a clear example of Pogge's
understanding that human beings prefer to take comfort from beliefs that will
favor themselves.
79. Kenneth Lay speaking at an Enron meeting, Dec. 1, 1999, cited by MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note
53 at 242; see also BRIAN CRUVER, ENRON, ANATOMY OF GREED (Arrow 2003).
80. See STIGLITZ, supra note 60, at 151 (italics in the original).
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VI. COMBATING CORRUPTION: NEW USES FOR
CONCESSION THEORY
Nowhere is there complete adherence to the theory that companies ought to
be permitted to function free of all regulation: all states operate a mixed system
of market freedom and regulatory control.8' However, traditional discussions of
corporate governance give little weight to the web of regulation that surrounds
every corporate operation and, in particular, the impact of regulations on
corporate culture has not been examined in its legal context. Is the way in which
companies actually work reflected in discussions of corporate governance and an
adequate legal framework?
The imposition of regulations may easily be justified by traditional
concessionary approaches: in its simplest form this approach views the existence
and operation of the company as a concession by the state, which grants the
ability to trade using the corporate tool, particularly where it operates with
limited liability. In return this concession implies the right to impose limits on a
company's freedom.82 The imposition of regulations inevitably identifies those at
most risk from particular corporate decisions and seeks to protect from or
minimize that risk. Thus, environmental regulation identifies whole communities
as at risk, financial regulation protects shareholders and health and safety
regulation principally targets employees.
As Teubner rightly says:
"Putting it quite bluntly, a corporate enterprise does not exist simply as a
self serving and self-realizing institution for the unique benefits of its
shareholders and workers, but rather exists, above all, to fulfill a broader
role in society."83
Indeed, large companies have a huge on influence our social, economic and
political lives. In the words of Chayes, "[T]hey are repositories of power, the
biggest centers of nongovernmental power in our society." 84 In the UK, the
influence of companies is just as evident as in the United States. The food we eat
is dependent on how it is grown, processed, packaged, advertised and sold to us.
Every one of these stages is determined or influenced by companies. Increasingly
81. See JANET DINE, GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (Cambridge University Press 2000).
82. Id. See also S. Bottomley, Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate
Regulation 19 FED. L. REV. 203 (1990); William Bratton Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm; Critical
Perspectives from History,41 STANFORD L. REV. 1471 (1989).
83. Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to
the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS'
LIABILITIES 149, 157 (Hopt and Teubner eds. 1987).
84. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason ed., Harvard University Press 1959).
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companies are involved in the provision of public services with the government
having created mechanisms such as private finance initiatives, and more recently
the proposals for community interest companies. Such mechanisms are
recognition of the influence of companies and their role in society. In such a
context it seems that the two company law assumptions that share the structure of
company law and corporate governance are not only anachronistic but in fact
wholly inaccurate in their representation of the character of companies today.
Teubner argues for a proceduralization of fiduciary duties that enables non-
shareholder interest-groups to participate in the monitoring and decision-making
functions. In Teubner's view, the role of the law should be to control indirectly
internal organizational structures, through external regulation. The role of the law
is external mobilization of internal control resources.85 The organizational
structures should allow for "discursive unification processes as to allow the
optimal balancing of company performance and company function by taking into
account the requirements of the non-economic environment." In short, Teubner
advocates a constitutionalization of the private corporation to make the corporate
conscience work "if that meant to force the organization to internalize outside
conflicts in the decision structure itself in order to take into account the non-
economic interests of workers, consumers, and the general public. 86 Teubner
highlights the role of disclosure, audit, justification, consultation and negotiation
and the duty to organize. He emphasizes the need to proceduralize. Ultimately,
the point is to ensure that the decision-making processes allow participation by
those affected by the decisions, whether in terms of profit, consumer choice,
working conditions, or environmental impact of corporate activities. If the
decisions are made jointly with the directors, the monitoring role ought to reduce.
Teubner's proceduralization would mean a complete change in conceptualization
of the company and directors' duties. The following tries to put some flesh on the
bones in the context of a new look at UK company law.
As we have seen, Berle and Means identified the separation of ownership and
control in the 1930s,87 showing that, with dispersed ownership of shares, control
of corporations lay less with shareholders and more with the professional
managers of large companies. This led to corporate governance being discussed
primarily as involving antidotes to such a separation, and in particular with
implementing mechanisms to align the managers' interests with those of
shareholders. Today there is a second shift in the governance of companies, this
time strengthening the degree of separation between ownership and control and
also shifting the focus and perhaps the power center of decision making to a
lower level in the company. This second shift calls into question the reality of the
85. See Teubner, supra note 83, at 160.
86. Id. at 165.
87. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan
1962).
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vision of a company exclusively directed by the "controlling minds" of
managers, but by acknowledging that directors still have the ultimate decision
making power is in line with the reconceptualization of a company as owner; the
directors are exercising their property rights powers on behalf of the company.
Limits on their decision-making, however, appear by way of providing them with
information from throughout the organization and insisting that the focus of their
decision-making should be an assessment of risks to the organization. This new
understanding would reject the idea of the company being composed solely of its
organs but, in some ways embrace the "organic" view of companies." The
organic analysis is borrowed from the analysis of states. Wolff89 cites John
Caspar Bluntschli who "found something corresponding in the life of the State
not only to every part of the human body but even to every human emotion, and
designated e.g., the foreign relations of a State as its sexual impulses!" In fact,
the organic theory is remarkably wide in its vision, many current theories would
omit the inclusion of the "hands" at all, regarding employees as negative
externalities, rather than as an integral part of the company's existence.
There are a multiplicity of regulations that companies must implement, and
systems are set up to implement them within companies. A simple example (and
the most obvious) is the systems which must be set up to ensure financial control.
In the Barings collapse, one of the problems that was clearly identified was the
lack of knowledge of the derivatives operation displayed by the directors. They
were eventually disqualified as directors for being unfit following their failure to
put in place proper systems of financial control. However, in order to create
effective systems they needed to fully familiarize themselves with the
functioning of the derivatives operation. It is argued here that, because detailed
knowledge of the operation of the systems that make up a functioning company
are to be found elsewhere than at board level and that proper systems of control
cannot be designed without this detailed knowledge, it is incumbent on the
eventual decision-makers to take account of the knowledge and experience of
those most intimately involved in the systems necessary to control the risks that
are the subject matter of the regulations.
This is not to say that the power to make the eventual decision has. moved,
but that proper decisions cannot be made without wide consultation. This, in turn,
gives those consulted standing to influence the decision-making process, and, in
particular, change the culture of the company from focusing on shareholder profit
alone.
The example of financial controls is just a single example of the regulations
which impinge on decision-making within companies. The company must remain
within the criminal law and must have systems that ensure this happens. This
88. M. Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons,, 54 L.QUARTERLY.REv. 494 (1938).
89. Id. at 499.
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may extend to ensuring consistency between methods of working and achievable
targets. For example, if time targets for repairs to electric signals on a railway
cannot be achieved without electricians working excessively long hours, the
inconsistency may be identified in the future as a reason for holding the company
(and its directors) criminally responsible for an ensuing disaster. Similarly,
proper systems for implementation of health and safety and environmental
regulations must rely on detailed knowledge of the way things actually work.
In effect, the imposition of regulations which must be implemented, gives the
company a greater degree of autonomy from the shareholders. As we have seen,
the shareholder property rights model led to a narrow definition of what is meant
by "Corporate Governance", with most commentators concerned only with the
methods by which management action can be controlled in order to ensure
management behavior for the benefit of the company - meaning, in the vast
majority of situations, for the financial benefit of shareholders. This tendency has
been reinforced by the legal boxes that have been constructed, particularly in
common law jurisdictions. Company law is seen as a separate discipline from
labor law, ignoring the fact of enormous proportions that the huge majority of
employees work for companies and that companies cannot work without
employees. Similarly, other regulatory structures impinge on corporate decision-
making so that it is no longer open to the shareholders to insist on profit at the
expense of compliance with health and safety standards, environmental regulations, 9
or consultation with employees. Nor can systems to ensure compliance with criminal
law be neglected.
In the recent U.S. scandals, particularly those like Enron and Worldcom,
which involved manipulating accounts in order to maintain inflated share prices,
we see a conflict between the old-fashioned view of corporate governance that
sought to create mechanisms for aligning the governance of the company with
shareholders' interest in profit maximization, and the vision described here which
seeks, by regulation, to make sure that companies have proper systems in place to
ensure their compliance with the requirements of society generally. Although it is
true that directors of these companies stood to gain personally from inflated share
prices, the primary motive for the creative accounting was the pressure to do
better than competitors so far as a continuously rising share price was concerned.
The system of corporate governance that relies primarily on shareholder
enforcement is shown not only to be inadequate but counterproductive, imposing
pressures destructive of both the company and the wider interests of society, both
in loss of faith in markets and destruction of things such as pension benefits.
90. See M. Blecher, Environmental Officer: Management in an Ecological Quality Organization in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL
SELF-ORGANISATION, (G. Teubner ed. 1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION
And so back to the BVI; even if such reforms were to lead to a more
sustainable, socially responsible and less corrupt corporate culture, this will not
solve the conundrum of the corruption of offshore tax havens. If reformed
companies decided that shareholder value was not the sole determinant of their
behavior, would they desert offshore financing? And if so, what would happen to
the development potential of the ex-slave colonies that currently rely on it?
Pogge would undoubtedly point to a duty to support the development of
previously exploited peoples. What should replace the easy income from
invisible companies?
